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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. On May 24, 1983, the State Assessed Property Division of 
the Commission sent a Notice of Assessment to Kennecott, informing 
Kennecott that its personal and real property had been assessed as 
of January 1, 1983. The assessed value of Kennecott's property for 
1983 was $136,685,576. R. 336. 
2. On June 1, 1983, Kennecott filed a Petition of Protest 
relative to its 1983 assessment with the Commission. This Petition 
protested the Notice of Assessment as it applied to the assessed 
real property "on the grounds that the Notice of Assessment . . . 
failed to apply a rollback to 1978 values on that real property 
assessed by the Utah State Tax Commission." R. 2. 
3. On June 29, 1983, the Commission held an informal hearing 
on Kennecott7s protect. R. 20. 
4. On January 26, 1984, the Commission issued a decision 
denying Kennecott the reduction it sought, and sustaining the 
original assessment. R. 20. 
5. On March 13, 1984, the Utah Supreme Court issued its 
decision in Rio Alaom Mining Corp. v. San Juan County, 681 P.2d 184 
(Utah 1984). The named plaintiffs in the Rio Alaom case were Rio 
Algom Corporation, Utah Power & Light, Energy Fuels Nuclear, Inc., 
Consolidated Oil and Gas, Inc., Atlas Corporation, and Northwest 
Pipeline Corporation. 
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6. On June 4, 1984, Kennecott petitioned the Commission for 
a formal hearing on its 1983 assessment. Kennecott specifically 
claimed that it was entitled to have the value of the property 
"rolled back" from its 1983 value to 1978 levels, pursuant to 
Article XIII, Section 4 of the Utah Constitution or, alternatively, 
pursuant to Article XIII, Sections 2 and 3. 
7. On September 11, 1984, the Commission held a formal 
hearing on Kennecott's 1983 protest and, on June 27, 1985, issued 
its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Final Decision. R. 
20. In its Final Decision, the Commission found that "the roll 
back in property values for locally assessed property was done 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 59-5-109 (1953, as amended). That 
statute was held to be unconstitutional by the Supreme Court of 
Utah in the case of Rio Alaom Corp. v. San Juan County, 681 P. 2d 
184 (Utah 1984). The Supreme Court stated in its decision that its 
determination was to be given only prospective relief and would be 
retroactive only in certain circumstances. Those circumstances 
only applied to the litigants in the Rio Alaom case. Since 
appellant [Kennecott] was not one of the six taxpayers that were 
parties to that decision, then Rio Alaom does not apply retroac-
tively. (Rio Alaom, supra)." R. 20-23. 
8. On November 26, 1985, Kennecott filed a Complaint, Notice 
of Appeal and Petition for Review of a Decision of the Utah State 
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Tax Commission in the Tax Division of the Third Judicial District 
Court, This action appealed the Commission's June 27, 1985, 
decision and prayed for an order reducing the valuation of 
Kennecott's property by the Commission for 1983 by the sum of 
$14,444,315, and for a refund of tax paid by Kennecott under 
protest, in the amount of $898,475. R. 1-8. 
9. On January 7, 1986, the Commission moved the District 
Court for an order dismissing Kennecott's complaint on the grounds 
that Kennecott was not entitled to relief by application of the 
ruling in Rio Alaom, supra. In the alternative, and in the event 
that the District Court concluded Kennecott was entitled to relief 
under Rio Alaom, the Commission moved that the case be remanded for 
further adjudication. R. 12-19. 
10. On August 18, 1986, the District Court issued a Decision 
and Order on the Commission's motion to dismiss. The District 
Court denied the motion, stating that the Commission had erroneous-
ly decided that Kennecott "was entitled to no relief under either 
Rio Alaom Corp. v. San Juan County, supra, or Article XIII, 
Sections 2 and 3, Utah Constitution." R. 220. The District Court 
did grant the Commission's motion to remand and instructed the 
Commission to give appropriate consideration to Rio Alaom factors. 
11. On June 27, 1987, the Commission entered an Order styled 
"Amended Final Decision and Order", which (1) reduced the assessed 
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value of Kennecott's property for 1983, and (2) further rolled back 
the reduced value to the 1978 level by applying a factor of 1.4. 
R. 247-250. 
12. Salt Lake County (the "County") appealed the Commission's 
Amended Final Decision and Order and the District Court remanded 
for a second time, with directions indicating that the reduction of 
value was improper and directing the Commission to make express 
findings concerning whether the two-pronged test contained in Rio 
Algom, supraf had been met. R. 423-429. 
13. On August 15, 1990, the Commission held a formal hearing 
pursuant to the Court's second remand order and, thereafter, 
entered an "order", dated September 5, 1991, determining that the 
requirements of Rio Alaom had been met. R. 528-533. 
14. Based upon the Commission's order of September 5, 1991, 
the District Court granted summary judgment in favor of Kennecott. 
R. 696-704, Appendix 1. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The sole issue in this cippeal concerns the application and 
interpretation of this court's decision in the Rio Alaom case, 
supra. It is the County's position that the District Court erred 
when it denied the motion of the County and the Commission to 
dismiss Kennecott's complaint. The District Court erroneously 
interpreted the Rio Alaom decision as establishing a test for 
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pending litigants, when the Utah Supreme Court clearly intended the 
relief granted in Rio Alaom to apply only to the six parties 
plaintiff in that case. In this case, Kennecott had an administra-
tive appeal pending before the Commission. 
In its responsive brief, Kennecott argues, based primarily 
upon recent United States Supreme Court cases, that this court's 
decision in the Rio Alaom case to grant retroactive relief only to 
the parties plaintiff in the case is unconstitutionally discrimina-
tory and deprives Kennecott of its constitutional rights under the 
Equal Protection and Due Process clauses of the state and federal 
constitutions. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
KENNECOTT IS NOT ENTITLED TO THE RELIEF 
GRANTED TO THE SIX PARTIES PLAINTIFF IN THE 
RIO ALGOM DECISION 
As a preliminary matter, it is important to note that the 
United States Supreme Court decisions relied upon by Kennecott in 
its responsive brief are interpretations of challenges to federal, 
not state, law. James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 501 U. S. 
, 111 S.Ct. 2439, 115 L.Ed.2d 481 (1991) [discriminatory impact 
of tax under federal Commerce Clause]; Bacchus Imports Ltd. v. 
Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 104 S.Ct. 3049, 82 L.Ed.2d 200 (1984) [liquor 
tax discriminatory under Commerce Clause]; and McKesson Corp. v. 
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Division of Alcoholic Beverages & Tobacco, 496 U.S. 18, 110 S.Ct. 
2238, 110 L.Ed. 2d 17 (1990) [discriminatory impact of excise tax 
in favor of local distributors violative of Commerce Clause]. 
It is also important to note that, for the first time in its 
responsive brief, Kennecott raises the specter of the United States 
Constitution's equal protection and due process clauses. In all 
prior proceedings, Kennecott has rested its claims for relief upon 
alleged discriminatory impact under state law. The equities of 
this case require that this Court give full effect to its decision 
in the Rio Alaom case and deny retroactive application of that 
decision to Kennecott in this case. 
Kennecott primarily relies on the United States Supreme 
Court's decision in the James B. Beam case, supra. Kennecott 
argues that the Beam case clearly establishes a new rule that 
"selective prospectivity" and "pure prospectivity" are beyond the 
jurisdiction of the courts and that any new rule of law must be 
retroactively applied. Brief of Respondent, p. 18. What Kennecott 
neglects to mention is the dearth of contradictory comments 
contained in the Beam decision. 
The issue before the court in the Beam case was whether the 
Court's decision in Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, supra, should be 
retroactively applied to the litigants in the Beam case. Justice 
Souter, writing the judgment of the court, in which Justice Stevens 
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joined, viewed the retroactive application rule as requiring a new 
rule of law which has been applied to the litigants in one case to 
be applied to all other litigants with cases pending at the time 
the new rule is announced. Justice White opined that, while 
Bacchus extended the benefit of that decision to the litigants in 
that case and to other litigants with pending cases at the time of 
the Bacchus decision, in proper cases, a new rule should not be 
applied retroactively, even to parties involved in the litigation 
and that automatic retroactive effect could not be justified under 
existing precedents. Justices Blackmun, Scalia, and Marshall 
expressed the views concerning "selective prospectivity" and "pure 
prospectivity" upon which Kennecott relies. And in a dissenting 
opinion, Justices O'Connor, Rehnquist, and Kennedy espoused the 
view that it was error for the rule established in the Bacchus 
decision to have been applied retroactively to the Bacchus 
litigants and that the Beam decision merely compounded the problem 
by imposing widespread liability on parties having no reason to 
expect it. 
It is the concern expressed by Justices O'Connor, Rehnquist, 
and Kennedy that most clearly illustrates the problems that this 
Court would create should it reverse its earlier holding in the Rio 
Alqom case and grant retroactive relief to Kennecott: 
. . . In this case, Georgia reasonably relied 
not only on the Young's Market line of cases 
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from this Court, but a Georgia Supreme Court 
decision upholding the predecessor to the tax 
statute at issue• [Citations omitted,] 
Nor is there much to weigh in the bal-
ance. Before Bacchus, the legitimate expecta-
tion of James Beam and other liquor manufac-
turers was that they had to pay the tax here 
at issue and that it was constitutional. They 
made their business decisions accordingly. 
There is little hardship to these companies 
from not receiving a tax refund they had no 
reason to anticipate. 
The equitable analysis of Chevron Oil 
places limitations on the liability that may 
be imposed on unsuspecting parties after this 
Court changes the law. James Beam claims that 
if Bacchus is applied retroactively, and the 
Georgia excise tax is declared to have been 
collected unconstitutionally from 1982 to 
1984, the State owes the company a $2.4 mil-
lion refund. [Citation omitted.] There are 
at least two identical refund actions pending 
in the Georgia Courts. These plaintiffs seek 
refunds of almost $28 million. [Citations 
omitted.] The State estimates its total 
potential liability to all those taxes at $30 
million. [Citation omitted.] To impose on 
Georgia and the other States that reasonably 
relied on this Court's established precedent 
such extraordinary retroactive liability, at a 
time when most States are struggling to fund 
even the most basic services, is the height of 
unfairness. 
We are not concerned here with a State 
that reaped an unconstitutional windfall from 
its taxpayers. Georgia collected in good 
faith what was at the time a constitutional 
tax. The Court now subjects the State to 
potentially devastating liability without fair 
warning. This burden will fall not on some 
corrupt state government, but ultimately on 
the blameless and unexpecting citizens of 
Georgia in the form of higher taxes and re-
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duced benefits. Nothing in our jurisprudence 
compels that result; our traditional analysis 
of retroactivity dictates against it. 
115 L.Ed.2d, at 503. 
Kennecott argues that any fiscal concerns of the County are 
"largely nonexistent" because Utah Code Annotated, § 63-30-27 
(Supp. 1989) permits the county to levy an annual property tax 
sufficient to pay the refund Kennecott seeks and § 63-30-25 (Supp. 
1989) would permit payment of the refund in installments. Those 
provisions, however, do not alter the fact that the County made the 
initial assessment, based on the statute, in good faith and that it 
is the taxpayers of the County who would be required to ultimately 
answer any judgment in favor of Kennecott. 
An important distinction between this case and the authority 
relied upon by Kennecott is illustrated in the McKesson decision. 
In its decision to impose potential liability on the State of 
Florida for tax refunds, the Court considered other remedies 
available to the State: 
More specifically, the State may cure the 
invalidity of the Liquor Tax by refunding to 
petitioner the difference between the tax it 
paid and the tax it would have been assessed 
were it extended the same rate reductions that 
its competitors actually received. [Citation 
omitted.] Alternatively, to the extent con-
sistent with other constitutional restric-
tions, the State may assess and collect back 
taxes from petitioner's competitors who bene-
fited from the rate reductions during the 
contested tax period, calibrating the retroac-
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tive assessment to create in hindsight a 
nondiscriminatory scheme. [Citation omitted.] 
Finally, a combination of a partial refund to 
petitioner and a partial retroactive assess-
ment of tax increases on favored competitors, 
so long as the resultant tax actually assessed 
during the contested tax period reflects a 
scheme that does not discriminate against 
interstate commerce, would render petitioner's 
resultant deprivation lawful and therefore 
satisfy the Due Process Clause's requirement 
of a fully adequate postdeprivation procedure. 
496 U.S., at 40-41. 
The remedies available to redress the discriminatory impact of 
the invalid provisions in the decisions relied upon by Kennecott, 
including levying additional tax assessments on taxpayers who re-
ceived favorable treatment under the unconstitutional statute, are 
simply not available to the County here. 
CONCLUSION 
Kennecott argues that it is entitled to be treated in the same 
manner as the other taxpayers similarly situated. In fact, with 
the exception of the six Rio Alaom litigants, that is precisely the 
manner in which Kennecott is being treated. There is no way to 
determine at this late date the number of taxpayers whose claims 
were pending at the time this Court announced its decision in Rio 
Alaom and who, then, abandoned their claims in reliance on this 
Court's holding. 
This Court's decision to limit relief in the Rio Alaom case to 
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the six parties plaintiff should be affirmed. The judgment granted 
by the Third Judicial District Court must be reversed and Kenne-
cott's request for refund must be denied. 
DATED this OCU day of November, 1992. 
DAVID E. YOCOM 
Salt JjStk^ County Attorney 
IICKSON 
£Lt Lake Count\ 
THOMAS 'PI 
Special Deputy Salt Lake County Attorney 
Attorneys for Salt Lake County 
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